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Abstract
This paper presents cross-country evidence confirming that countries with more
ethnolinguistic diversity have lower levels of economic growth.  But, controlling for
other factors, in a sample of 113 countries over the 1960-1990 period we find that the
economic cost of diversity is small relative to the benefit of larger country size, and is
smaller at higher levels of national income. We conclude that investments in national
unity have been associated with faster growth, particularly (but not exclusively) when
accompanied by other conditions favoring growth.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 1
ETHNOLINGUISTIC DIVERSITY, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ACROSS COUNTRIES
Introduction
Recent studies have found that more ethnolinguistically diverse groups invest less in
collective goods such as municipal services (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1997), local
charities (Schubert and Tweed 1999) and national social welfare programs (Sanderson
1999), and also achieve lower levels of economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997,
Rodrik 1998).  We confirm these findings, but add other evidence suggesting a very
different interpretation of the data, with opposite policy implications from those
previously drawn.
Using data for up to 113 countries from 1960 through 1990, we show that ethnolinguistic
diversity is not significantly related to country size, as it might be if it were exogenously
distributed across the globe.  In contrast, diversity levels are significantly higher in
countries with lower initial per-capita income.  This observation, along with the historical
evidence that ethnolinguistic barriers vary widely in their importance over time (e.g. in
the rapid assimilation of many ethnic groups in the United States since 1945) and within
countries (e.g. in the persistence of barriers in some locations while they disappear
elsewhere), leads to the hypothesis that persistent observable divisions may be seen as
endogenous responses to poverty and insecurity rather than exogenous causes of low
income.
The persistence of ethnolinguistic barriers in response to resource scarcity or uncertainty
could arise simply because ethnolinguistic ties are used as substitutes for commercial
markets.  A few of the key uses for ethnolinguistic networks documented in the literature
include facilitating employment searches (Ahmad 1996) and non-collateralized credit
(Grimard 1997 for consumption purposes, Fafchamps 1998a, 1998b for production
activities).  Investment in “ethnic capital” has been shown to be particularly important for
lower-income people within industrialized countries (e.g. Borjas 1998) and for traders
facing greater uncertainty about market conditions (Wallace et al. 1997) or product
characteristics (Rauch 1996a, 1996b).
To test whether observed diversity is a result of poverty rather than its cause, we
incorporate diversity measures into a standard model of economic growth.  The results
indicate that although ethnolinguistic fractionalization is correlated with lower economic
growth over time, the effect is significantly smaller at higher levels of income.  Poverty
exacerbates the effects of diversity on growth, and in any event the magnitude of
diversity’s costs are small relative to the benefits of larger country size.  Thus,
particularly at higher income levels, there has been a substantial payoff to building
unified countries out of diverse ethnolinguistic groups.
Our study helps identify the economic payoff from unifying diverse societies into larger
political units, and hence is an important complement to recent studies highlighting the
costs of social diversity.  The studies which initially identified the association betweenDiversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 2
diversity, low provision of public goods, and poor economic performance can easily lead
to the conclusion that on balance diversity is costly so that separate political
representation would promote economic efficiency.  This conclusion can be derived from
several different explanations of the observed correlations, including both short-term
economic choices as well as long-term evolutionary selection for certain types of
behavior.
Among economic explanations, a standard approach draws on local-public-finance
theory, following Tiebout (1956).  Tiebout models argue that each individual has a
greater economic incentive to invest in collective activities with others who have similar
needs. This view implies that the well being of each individual may call for them to
“Tiebout-sort” themselves into groups with homogeneous interests, even if their origins
differ.
Among evolutionary explanations, a standard approach draws on the principle of
inclusive-fitness, due to Hamilton (1964) and popularized by Dawkins (1976).  Inclusive-
fitness models argue that natural selection favors altruistic and cooperative behavior
towards others who may share genetic material.  A similar notion can be extended to non-
kin through the selection for reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). The inclusive-fitness or
reciprocal-altruism arguments imply that the well being of each individual may call for
them to sort themselves into subgroups of homogenous lineage who are mutually
supportive, even if their economic interests differ.
An intermediate approach involving both economic choice and evolutionary selection is
the concept of mutual aid (Kropotkin 1902) formalized more recently as the evolution of
cooperation (e.g. Axelrod 1984). The “evolutionary economics” approach argues that
people may choose strategies that promise long-term payoffs over repeated interactions,
if the conditions under which interaction occurs favor cooperation.
All three types of explanation for the observed correlations -- economic (Tiebout-
sorting), evolutionary (inclusive-fitness or reciprocal altruism) and evolutionary
economics – emply different mechanisms but lead to the same conclusion: all three imply
that allowing distinct groups to have their own political representation can help all
members of both groups pursue their individual goals more effectively. This is the central
insight of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), who argue that “a desire to share your country
with people you like” (quoted in The Economist 1998) helps explains the relative success
of some small ethnolinguistically homogeneous nations such as Iceland.
Although we find that being homogeneous can be an advantage, our analysis suggests
that providing separate political representation is not likely to promote growth. Indeed,
addressing inter-group conflicts with separation could be like addressing fevers with cold
baths: it might provide temporary relief of local symptoms, while the disease rages on.  In
some cases, granting sovereignty to the parties in “civil” wars could have the disastrous
effect of arming each party with the instruments of state power.  To take a historical
example, what might the consequences have been for the Caribbean if the Confederacy
had been granted sovereignty by the United States?  Once saved from the north, it mightDiversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 3
have turned its aggression southward.  And for the future, what will prove to be the
consequences of having allowed partition between India and Pakistan?  Their inter-state
conflict could have (nuclear) fallout that intra-state conflict might not have brought.
To assess the relationship between ethnolinguistic divisions and economic performance,
we turn now to our data and empirical results, and we conclude with a brief section on
some implications of our findings.
Data and Empirical Results
Description of the data
Ethnolinguistic diversity is, as its name implies, an inherently multidimensional concept.
Reducing ethnolinguistic information to one number inevitably throws away information
about the other dimensions -- geographic origin does not always convey appearance,
language or culture, and the definition of a group membership may be ambiguous.
Petersen (1997) provides numerous examples of the difficulties involved in identifying
group membership.  Nonetheless, from the emerging literature on ethnolinguistic
divisions we draw five sets of measures covering virtually all of the world’s countries.
Two of our measures were compiled by Vanhanen (1991), two are drawn from data
reported by Easterly and Levine (1997), and one is from the U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1999).
The first observation we use is Easterly and Levine’s calculation of the probability that
two randomly selected people will belong to a different ethnolinguistic group, based on
data collected by Soviet researchers in the early 1960s.  Easterly and Levine call this
measure ELF-60, and we will refer to it as ETHNIC1.
Our ETHNIC2 variable is the proportion of people who are outside the dominant group,
calculated from Vanhanen’s “Ethnic Homogeneity” (EH) index.  Vanhanen’s original
measure is defined as the percentage of the national population belonging to the “largest
homogeneous ethnic group” (Vanhanen 1991, p. 23).  To make the sign of our coefficient
estimates consistent with those of ETHNIC1, we convert it to a diversity index
(ETHNIC2 = (100-EH)).
A third measure related to the first is the probability of two randomly selected people
speaking different languages, which we call LANG.  Easterly and Levine (1997) report
two different datasets for this concept, with slightly different samples—to expand the
sample size while weighting the two measures equally we have combined them into one
measure, using whichever is available or their average if both are reported.
Additional measures used to address other dimensions of diversity are the proportion of
the population that are new migrants (MIGR), available from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census website (www.census.gov) for the 1990s only, and the proportion of the
population that voted for opposition political parties (which we call OPPO), a figure
reported by Vanhanen (1991) for the mid-1980s based on the opposition’s share of votesDiversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 4
cast multiplied by the voter participation rate.  Both of these measures seem sensitive to
government policies on immigration (for MIGR) and the role of opposition parties (for
OPPO).
Our economic variables are all taken from what has become the standard worldwide
source of comparative economic data, the Penn World Tables version 5.6 available from
numerous websites (our source, which has a particularly friendly interface and fast
service from Europe, is www.bized.ac.uk).  The PWT database is important because it
uses survey data on relative prices to compute national income and expenditure at
internationally comparable “purchasing power parity” (PPP) levels, offering a variety of
indexes suitable for various purposes.
The particular PWT data we use are annual population estimates, real income (defined as
GDP at PPP prices using a chain index), government size (defined as central government
expenditure deflated by the government-specific PPP price index, as a share of GDP
deflated by the economywide PPP index) and openness (defined as the nominal value of
exports plus imports as a share of nominal GDP).  We refer to these as GDP, GVT and
OPEN respectively.  For each of these variables, we use a three-year average for 1960-62
to measure their initial value and a decade average for 1980-90 to measure their ending
value.  These years were chosen to smooth out the influence of worldwide economic
shocks that have affected groups of countries in similar ways in particular years,
particularly the decline in oil and other commodity prices over the 1980s.  We also
calculate the GDP growth rate for 1960-90, using the OLS regression method (that is, the
number reported is the antilog minus one of the coefficient on time estimated in a
regression of the log of GDP on the year with a constant).  This approach gives us a GDP
growth rate that gives equal weight to data observed in each year, and does not give
particular importance to the initial or ending years.
To identify expenditure on a particularly “public” sort of government activity—i.e. one
that generates widely spread benefits, and does not reflect redistribution to or from
particular interest groups within the country -- we use expenditure on foreign aid.  Many
countries give small amounts of aid for short periods of time, but only 17 countries have
significant programs that are consistently reported to the agency that monitors aid flows,
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.  From the OECD’s
website (www.oecd.org) we have data on annual aid flows over the 1961-1992 period,
which we convert to their PPP equivalents using each donor’s price level and exchange
rate from the PWT, and report here as a proportion of PPP GDP.
Which countries are more diverse?
To look at the data we begin with Figure 1, showing our three basic measures of diversity
against population around 1960 (specifically the 1960-62 average).  This view is
motivated by the hypothesis that larger countries might cover a larger variety of
ethnolinguistic groups, which turns out not to hold in these data. The absence of
correlation is itself meaningful, perhaps implying that even in the smallest countries,
individuals can find ethnolinguistic differences to assert if they choose to do so – andDiversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 5
even in the largest countries huge majorities can be put in the same category, if they are
willing to be seen as similar.
Figure 2 shows the same measures and openness to trade.  Again no correlation is
apparent.  Whether the country is relatively isolated from the rest of the world (with a
low ratio of trade to domestic activity) or very open to it (with a high ratio) seems not to
be associated with reported diversity levels.  Again the absence of correlation can be
interpreted to mean that, however the nation relates to the rest of the world, it can find
itself divided or unified.
Finally, Figures 3a, 3b and 3c show the three diversity measures separately against the
initial level of income in our time series, defined as the 1960-62 average of real GDP per
capita.  Here the relationships are clearly visible: by all three measures, but particularly
LANG, countries that had low per-capita incomes in 1960-62 had high diversity levels,
while higher-income countries had less diversity.  The most uniformly low diversity
occurs among middle-income countries.  At the highest levels of income, moderate
diversity is seen, perhaps because these countries attract high rates of immigration from
lower-income countries.
The relationship between diversity, policy choices and economic outcomes is
undoubtedly complex.  But visual examination of the data, along with some reflection on
the historical and comparative experiences of various groups in different contexts, leads
us to suspect that ethnolinguistic diversity may be seen as an endogenous response to
socioeconomic conditions, rather than a fixed biological fact influencing society.  We
begin our empirical investigation of diversity’s role by examining its association with
government expenditure, and then consider its correlations with economic performance.
How does diversity affect government expenditure?
To examine the links between diversity and policy choices, we must control for other
factors expected to be correlated with government activity.  The identification of those
correlates is a relatively new question for economics, with a standard contemporary work
being Rodrik (1999).  Rodrik finds that countries with greater openness to trade have
larger governments, and hypothesizes that this is due to the greater riskiness of
international trade and the consequently greater need for the risk-reducing services
provided by government.
Following Rodrik, we do control for the relative openness of countries – but find the
coefficient on that variable to be not significantly different from zero and of the opposite
sign from Rodrik’s estimates.  One reason why our results could differ, despite similar
methods and data sources, is that his dependent variables are the 1985-89 and 1990-92
average levels of government expenditure, whereas we use the average for a longer
period (1980-90).  The 1985-92 period used by Rodrik happened to be one of relatively
high world real interest rates, and governments in more open economies may have been
influenced similarly by that common shock.  We point this out because our finding does
not necessarily contradict Rodrik’s more fundamental point that one of government’s key
roles is to reduce risks.  Since these risks could originate in domestic disturbances as wellDiversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 6
as in trade, our finding merely underscores that in a worldwide sample the economies
most vulnerable to risk may not be the most open ones.
To reformulate Rodrik’s fundamental hypothesis in a way more suited to a worldwide
sample, we seek other observable characteristics that might be associated with risk.  The
most obvious is per-capita income: people in poorer countries are likely to face much
more risk, in almost all the senses of that word. The most important by far is the risk of
death, which recedes rapidly as incomes rise.  But governments help reduce many other
kinds of risk as well, and these are often more relevant in poorer countries than in richer
ones.  For example many governments spend huge amounts of money trying to stabilize
the real price of staple foods and the employment or wealth of influential people, but
attempts to do so consistently cost a greater share of real income in poorer than in richer
countries.
Using income as proxy for risk is probably confounded by an offsetting effect of higher
income on government spending: to the extent that higher real GDP per capita raises real
wages, it raises the per-unit cost of services relative to the prices of goods.  And to the
extent that services account for a larger of government activity than private-sector work,
higher incomes raise the cost of providing a given level of government activity.  Thus we
expect higher incomes to be associated with a higher share of income spent on
government activity, even if the “quantity” of service provided remains unchanged.
To assess the impact of diversity, we regress the size of government on our two control
variables, openness and real income, and then add the diversity measures to determine
their additional explanatory power (if any). Following Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) we
also considered the impact of country size on government, but this variable adds little to
our regressions and is consequently dropped in the results we show here. Results are
reported in Table 1 for government size in the 1960-62 period, and then in Table 2 for the
1980-90 period.   The regressors (independent variables) are identical for the two tables.
The clear result of our two sets of regressions is that the diversity measures have very
little significant correlation with government expenditure as a whole. When we control
for income level, the diversity measures add a little explanatory power—but only for the
regressions when ethnicity is measured contemporaneously with government size (i.e. the
GVT60 regressions using ETHNIC1 and LANG). For the 1980s, none of the diversity
measures have any statistical significance in any of the regressions, and none the
regressions explain more than 13 percent of cross-country variance.  We conclude from
this that government expenditure as a whole is not consistently linked to diversity levels.
How does diversity affect public-goods provision at the national level?
The definition of government used in Tables 1 and 2 covers all government activity, and
hence includes very large amounts of redistributive spending between groups within the
country, as well as national public goods which benefit everyone. And although Tables 1
and 2 show little correlation between ethnolinguistic diversity and total spending, this
result could mask shifts in the composition of government spending between
redistributive programs and productive public goods.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 7
Theoretical work such as Schiff (1997) suggests that more diverse countries are likely to
spend more on nonproductive redistribution, but Sanderson (1999) shows that more
diverse countries tend to spend less on certain kinds of redistributive welfare programs.
On balance, we have as yet no empirical tests of this proposition at the national level.  It
is only at the local level that a diversity effect on public-goods investment has been
shown, most notably by Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1997).  Local public resources
might be characterized as “collective” goods, which can be provided through a wide
range of mechanisms in the private as well as public sectors.  To find a government
activity whose net benefits we can characterize as a broader “public” good, with costs
and benefits spread widely across the economy, we turn to foreign aid. Foreign aid might
offer a particularly good empirical test of the links between diversity and the provision of
public goods, because it is a highly visible, easily measured flow of resources that
provides a (small) benefit to most everyone in the donor country.
The benefits of foreign aid to the donor population include a more secure military or
diplomatic environment, more profitable trade and investment, and the satisfaction of
moral and religious interests. Because the constituencies served by foreign aid are so
varied, support is usually thin and the coalitions come apart easily—but support is
widespread and the coalitions consistently come together again, so that virtually all
countries with sufficiently high levels of national income have substantial and enduring
foreign-aid programs.  Thus foreign aid is a good example of a national public good
which involves almost no redistribution within the country.
For the sample of 17 countries that give foreign aid, Table 3 presents panel results over
four separate decades, and the panel of all four periods pooled together.  We use this
approach to increase the sample size, as well as to consider possible differences across
the decades. The first set of columns presents the results when ethnicity is not included,
and the next four sets present results with each measure of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity
used in turn.  (Because of the strong collinearity between the measures, regressions that
combine them are not meaningful.)  The first set of rows present the results for the whole
panel, and the next four present each decade.
Regression results for the regressions with economic variables only, not controlling for
ethnolinguistic divisions, have all coefficients of the expected sign in all regressions over
all decades and also the whole pool, but only the government-size variable is consistently
significant at the 95 percent level.  Openness & population size are never statistically
significant, and real income is significant only over the whole pool.  R-squares are around
50% over the whole pool and also for the 1990s (lower for earlier decades).
In the appendix, Tables E1, E2, E3 and E4 report results from the same regressions when
individual economic variables are omitted.  For the regressions without ethnolinguistic
data, we note that the R-square values fall only slightly when the two weak variables
(population and openness) are omitted, and fall to 40 percent and lower when income or
government size is omitted.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 8
When we add our ethnicity variables to the regressions, R-square values rise
substantially, as do the t-statistics for each variable.  Coefficients on diversity are
generally negative, as more diverse donors give less foreign aid. The ETHNIC2 variable
is most closely correlated. In that case the R-square is an astonishingly high 80 percent
for the 1990s, and 75 percent for the 1980s, with correspondingly high t-statistics for
each individual variable.  But the other ethnicity variables also perform well, and we note
that the closeness of the correlation improves over time suggesting perhaps that, as these
countries’ foreign aid programs mature, they are converging towards common patterns of
behavior.  We interpret these results to mean that economic factors (mainly income and
government size) plus diversity do an excellent job of explaining patterns of foreign aid
provision,
All four of the variables used to capture ethnolinguistic diversity are one-dimensional
shadows of a nuanced, multidimensional picture.  To give us a less ambiguous measure
of diversity we test the same model with MIGR, the proportion of the population that are
new migrants in 1993.  (Note that this number is negative for Japan, the only donor
country to suffer out-migration in the 1990s – a fact that reveals much about Japan’s
relative standard of living.)  Appendix Tables F and G present these estimates, showing
strikingly similar results.
How does diversity affect economic growth?
We investigate correlations between diversity and growth using the same approach as for
government spending, with regression results reported in Table 4.  The first set of results,
in section (a), reports results for a stylized growth model, building on Adam Smith’s
(1776) principle that growth depends on the “extent of the market,” which we measure by
both national population and the relative volume of international trade, augmented by the
Solow (1956)-Swan (1956) model of diminishing returns to additional resources, with the
initial level of resources measured by initial income.  In fact, the entire regression can be
interpreted as a test of the Solow-Swan model, with the extent of the market as a proxy
for the (unobserved) profitability and level of new investment, and the level of initial
income as a proxy for the (unobserved) profitability and level of past investment.  The
regression finds strong support for the extent-of-the-market model, but none for
diminishing returns, and in any case the total amount of cross-country variance that is
explained is quite small (about 10 percent).
To assess the impact of ethnolinguistic diversity we add the three major diversity indexes
in section (b) of the table.  Doing so more than doubles the equations’ R-square values,
raises the magnitudes of the extent-of-the-market variables, and the coefficient on initial
income is still indistinguishable from zero (although its estimated sign has turned
negative as Solow-Swan theory predicts).  Diversity itself has a significantly negative
coefficient, but the magnitude is extremely small: a one percent higher level of
heterogeneity is associated with a decrease in the average annual growth rate of 0.026 to
0.036 percent (between two and four one hundredths of one percent).  In contrast, the
magnitude of the coefficient on population is relatively large: incorporating an additional
million people would increase growth by 0.4 to 0.9 one-hundredths of a percent.  To take
an arbitrary example, if Canada had joined the United States in 1960, for example,
Canada’s additional population of 184 million would have added around one percentageDiversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 9
point to former Canadians’ average annual growth rate, while former U.S. citizens gained
one-tenth as many people and would have gained a tenth of one percent in annual growth.
The diversity effect alone, however, still leaves us with R-square values of under 30
percent.  We can raise them substantially by controlling for a major determinant of the
payoff to investment, namely whether a country is located in the tropics.  This
particularly affects the productivity of agricultural investment, as the tropics are
characterized by extreme biodiversity and interspecific competition from parasites,
diseases and weeds. Being in the tropics might have many other effects as well.  In any
case its influence on investment productivity is visible through the tropical-dummy
variable’s impact on the initial-GDP coefficient.  . Controlling for tropical location gives
statistical significance to the Solow-Swan  hypothesis, revealing strong diminishing
returns to new investment.
Although our model is still extremely stylized, judicious choice of variables allows it to
explain from 33 to 42 percent of the growth differences across countries—a remarkable
performance for such a sparse model, using only five independent variables.  Many
studies using growth models like ours, which is in the tradition initiated by Barro (1991),
employ a dozen or more regressors.  Sala-i-Martin (1997) identifies over 20 variables that
are very likely to be significant, out a total of 59 drawn from previous studies.  But it is
often not clear how these variables affect growth, so their significance could well come at
the expense of other regressors with which they are correlated.  As a result we stop
adding new variables here, but consider one more question: is the impact of diversity on
growth independent of initial income, or related to it?
To test the link between diversity effects and initial income, we include interaction terms
in all three regressions: these turn out to be significantly positive in two of the three cases
(with ETHNIC1 and LANG), as higher diversity reduces growth more in low-income
than in high-income countries.  This simple result is undoubtedly our most important one,
since it provides the only direct test done to date of whether the low income observed to
correlate with diversity are a result or a cause of that diversity.
Much additional work remains to be done to analyze the links between ethnolinguistic
groupings and economic performance, but our initial evidence is quite clear:
ethnolinguistic fractionalization appears to be an endogenous response to resource
scarcity, as ethnolinguistic networks are used to provide various services such as job
search, social insurance and informal credit. That these networks are used implies that
they benefit those who use them—but they reduce aggregate growth, which implies they
are costly to others in the society.  Those costs are lower at higher levels of income,
which implies that periods of recent or expected future economic growth provide
“windows of opportunity” for social integration, which themselves contribute to further
growth.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 10
Conclusions for Darwinian evolution and the ethics of changing social boundaries
The explanatory theory we propose in this paper is not new, and the policy implication it
carries could be one of the oldest principles of social life: subgroup solidarity is useful in
times of scarcity and uncertainty, but when conditions improve those who reach out to
cooperate with other groups will be rewarded with higher living standards, while those
who continue to rely on historical ties will fall behind.
Current levels of wealth and security are too recent to have influenced the long-term
evolution of human biology, but this does not mean that Darwinian principles cannot help
us understand the consequences of choosing between subgroup solidarity (which for
example in African-American circles may be called a “race man”), and species-feeling
(what we might now call “just man”). Indeed, the very fact that people are equipped to
learn multiple languages and cultural styles, instead of only one, suggests that social
mobility may have been advantageous for much of our history.  We certainly have long
needed to cooperate across group boundaries for all of humanity to survive in a world
populated by other species.  We have even needed to reach across species boundaries and
“cooperate” with plants and animals, for all of life to survive against the inanimate world.
The key point is that it may often be the ability to establish new affiliations, not the
persistence of old affiliations, that is characteristic of evolutionary success.
The language used for these arguments may have changed over the years, but our same
point was well summarized by Thomas Huxley a century ago, at the birth of Darwinian
thought:
For his successful progress throughout the savage state, man has been largely indebted to
those qualities which he shares with the ape and the tiger; his exceptional physical
organization; his cunning, his sociability, his curiosity, and his imitativeness; his ruthless
and ferocious destructiveness when his anger is roused by opposition.  But, in proportion
as men have passed from anarchy to social organization, and in proportion as civilization
has grown in worth, these deeply ingrained serviceable qualities have become defects…
In fact, civilized man brands all these ape and tiger promptings with the name of sins; he
punishes many of the acts which flow from them as crimes; and, in extreme cases, he
does his best to put an end to the survival of the fittest of former days by axe and rope.
T.H. Huxley
Evolution and Ethics (The Romanes Lecture, 1893)
Huxley’s argument is a more eloquent appeal to logic and emotion than our exposition of
the same point, perhaps because he had less data than we do.  Today we can look back
instead of forward, and compare the political behavior of an unprecendented number and
variety of nations.  On that basis we can add to Huxley’s argument that our continuing
evolutionary adaptation to changing environments could well involve imposing a
measure of political correctness, branding ethnocentric ideas “with the name of sins” and
punishing “the acts which flow from them as crimes.” Over the past three decades at
least, melting down inherited social divisions to form larger more homogeneous nations
has indeed been a successful strategy. Some people may continue to commit crimes in the
name of group solidarity, as people do in pursuit of all our “ape and tiger promptings”,Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 11
but the historical and cross-country evidence suggests that these crimes have –at least in
the past – been punished enough to put them in the error term rather than along the best-
fit line.  In recent decades, economic success from integration appears to be a descriptive
norm, as well as a political ambition.
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Table 1 .  Regressions with Initial Government Size (1960-62) as Dependent Variable
Diversity omitted Diversity=ETHNIC1 Diversity=ETHNIC2 Diversity=LANG Diversity=OPPO
Independent (n=125) (n=105) (n=113) (n=95) (n=113)
Variables: coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
diversity 0.063 3.07 *** 0.043 1.79 * 0.073 3.20 *** -0.116 -2.60 **
constant 11.525 11.08 *** 12.967 12.83 *** 11.781 11.92 *** 15.773 19.69 ***
adj.R-sq 0.075 0.019 0.090 0.049
gdp60 -0.001 -3.15 *** -0.001 -3.40 *** -0.001 -3.06 *** -0.001 -2.68 *** -0.001 -3.06 ***
constant 16.172 19.91 *** 16.192 19.15 *** 16.213 19.28 *** 15.945 18.14 *** 16.213 19.28 ***
adj.R-sq 0.067 0.092 0.069 0.061 0.069
gdp60 -0.001 -3.05 *** -0.001 -3.31 *** -0.001 -3.00 *** -0.001 -2.59 -0.001 -3.00 ***
open60 -0.017 -1.14 -0.020 -1.32 -0.011 -0.67 -0.028 -1.75 -0.011 -0.67
constant 17.014 15.48 *** 17.192 15.19 *** 16.739 14.48 *** 17.251 15.07 *** 16.739 14.48 ***
adj.R-sq 0.069 0.099 0.065 0.082 0.065
gdp60 -0.001 -2.44 ** -0.001 -2.50 ** 0.000 -1.35 -0.001 -1.65
open60 -0.020 -1.34 -0.012 -0.73 -0.029 -1.85 * -0.010 -0.62
diversity 0.044 2.09 ** 0.023 0.91 0.058 2.32 ** -0.032 -0.48
constant 14.888 9.51 *** 15.838 10.40 *** 14.627 9.19 *** 16.767 14.44 ***
adj.R-sq 0.128 0.063 0.124 0.058
Notes:  Asterisks denote confidence levels of 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*).
 Dependent variable is average 1960-92 government share of GDP (labeled CG in Penn World Tables 5.6).
 Independent variables are gdp60 (GDP per capita in real PPP constant dollars, chain index, labelled rGDPch in PWT 5.6) and
      open60 (exports + imports as a share of GDP, labelled OPEN in PWT 5.6), both 1960-62 averages.
 Diversity measure ETHNIC1 is the probability of two randomly selected individuals being of a distinct ethnolinguistic group, using
      data from around 1960 (labelled "ELF60" in Easterly & Levine 1997); ETHNIC2 is the share of the population is a nondominant
      group in the mid-1980s (calculated from the "EH" index of Vanhanen 1991); LANG is the probability of two individuals speaking
      different languages (the average of MULLER and ROBERTS variables in Easterly & Levine 1997); OPPO is the share of the
      population voting in opposition to government in the mid-1980s (calculated from the ID-85 index of Vanhanen 1991).
 Sample countries are listed in Annex Table A.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 14
Table 2.  Regressions with 1980s Government Size (average of 1981-90) as Dependent Variable
Diversity omitted Diversity=ETHNIC1 Diversity=ETHNIC2 Diversity=LANG Diversity=OPPO
Independent (n=125) (n=105) (n=113) (n=95) (n=113)
Variables: coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
diversity -0.041 2.23 *** 0.040 1.89 * 0.046 2.21 ** -0.141 -3.75 ***
constant 18.620 19.91 *** 19.274 21.93 *** 18.571 20.48 *** 22.256 32.87 ***
adj.R-sq 0.037 0.022 0.040 0.104
gdp60 -0.009 -3.71 *** -0.001 -4.11 *** -0.001 -4.19 *** -0.001 -3.34 *** -0.001 -4.19 ***
constant 22.846 30.75 *** 22.456 30.86 *** 22.680 32.01 *** 21.975 28.52 *** 22.680 32.01 ***
adj.R-sq 0.093 0.132 0.129 0.097 0.129
gdp60 -0.001 -37.66 *** -0.001 -4.11 *** -0.001 -4.28 *** -0.001 -3.36 *** -0.001 -4.28 ***
open60 -0.013 0.09 0.006 0.43 0.017 1.24 0.009 0.61 0.017 1.24
constant 22.216 22.175 22.59 *** 21.860 22.56 *** 21.573 21.19 *** 21.860 22.56 ***
adj.R-sq 0.092 0.126 0.133 0.129 0.133
gdp60 -0.001 -3.52 *** -0.001 -3.83 *** -0.001 -2.62 *** -0.001 -2.04 **
open60 0.006 0.43 0.016 1.19 0.008 0.59 0.018 1.33
diversity 0.018 0.99 0.011 0.54 0.020 0.88 -0.063 -1.14
constant 21.215 15.36 *** 21.412 16.73 *** 20.668 14.26 *** 21.913 22.62 ***
adj.R-sq 0.125 0.128 0.089 0.135
Note:  Asterisks denote confidence levels of 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*).
 Dependent variable is average 1960-92 government share of GDP (labeled CG in Penn World Tables 5.6).
 Independent variables are gdp60 (GDP per capita in real PPP constant dollars, chain index, labelled rGDPch in PWT 5.6) and
      open60 (exports + imports as a share of GDP, labelled OPEN in PWT 5.6), both 1960-62 averages.
 Diversity measure ETHNIC1 is the probability of two randomly selected individuals being of a distinct ethnolinguistic group, using
      data from around 1960 (labelled "ELF60" in Easterly & Levine 1997); ETHNIC2 is the share of the population is a nondominant
      group in the mid-1980s (calculated from the "EH" index of Vanhanen 1991); LANG is the probability of two individuals speaking
      different languages (the average of MULLER and ROBERTS variables in Easterly & Levine 1997); OPPO is the share of the
      population voting in opposition to government in the mid-1980s (calculated from the ID-85 index of Vanhanen 1991).
 Sample countries are listed in Annex Table A.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 15
TABLE 3.  REGRESSION RESULTS EXPLAINING FOREIGN AID INTENSITY USING ALL ECONOMIC VARIABLES
No ethnicity variable Ethnicity=ETHNIC1 Ethnicity=ETHNI
C2
Ethnicity=LANG Ethnicity=OPPO
R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio
Whole panel (n=68) 0.521 0.527 0.630 0.527 0.527
POP -2.27E-08 -1.43 -2.07E-08 -1.32 -2.21E-08 -2.19 -2.27E-08 -1.50 -1.49E-08 -0.94
RGDP 1.16E-06 4.95 1.19E-06 5.01 1.41E-06 6.07 1.22E-06 5.13 1.34E-06 5.19
GVT 6.12E-04 3.14 5.39E-04 2.52 4.20E-04 3.07 5.34E-04 2.64 5.14E-04 2.63
OPEN 3.19E-05 1.00 4.78E-05 1.28 3.69E-05 1.80 4.51E-05 1.39 1.15E-05 0.35
[ethnicity] -3.69E-03 -0.79 -1.04E-02 -4.81 -6.38E-03 -1.16 1.90E-04 1.67
CONSTANT -1.73E-02 -5.08 -1.69E-02 -5.00 -1.52E-02 -5.49 -1.69E-02 -5.00 -2.35E-02 -4.74
1960s data only (n=17) 0.062 0.022 0.096 0.046 -0.015
POP 5.01E-09 1.37 4.07E-09 1.03 4.84E-09 1.35 4.63E-09 1.25 4.49E-09 1.07
RGDP 5.43E-08 0.71 3.51E-08 0.42 -5.26E-09 -0.06 3.09E-08 0.38 3.75E-08 0.39
GVT 4.41E-05 0.84 5.80E-05 1.02 6.25E-05 1.16 6.72E-05 1.14 4.93E-05 0.86
OPEN 1.89E-06 0.24 -2.52E-06 -0.25 1.51E-06 0.19 -8.76E-07 -0.10 2.57E-06 0.30
[ethnicity] 7.16E-04 0.72 8.66E-04 1.20 1.09E-03 0.90 -8.21E-06 -0.30
CONSTANT -5.81E-04 -0.59 -4.75E-04 -0.47 -5.35E-04 -0.55 -6.68E-04 -0.67 -2.52E-04 -0.17
1970s data only (n=17) 0.357 0.299 0.515 0.358 0.319
POP -1.64E-09 -0.17 -1.67E-09 -0.16 -2.06E-09 -0.24 -1.36E-09 -0.14 3.76E-10 0.03
RGDP 3.17E-07 1.21 3.15E-07 0.94 7.16E-07 2.47 4.72E-07 1.56 4.50E-07 1.27
GVT 2.62E-04 2.22 2.63E-04 1.79 1.99E-04 1.87 2.15E-04 1.70 2.39E-04 1.87
OPEN 4.18E-05 1.92 4.15E-05 1.30 4.90E-05 2.56 5.45E-05 2.17 3.73E-05 1.58
[ethnicity] 4.55E-05 0.01 -4.54E-03 -2.21 -4.02E-03 -1.01 5.19E-05 0.58
CONSTANT -6.46E-03 -1.82 -6.44E-03 -1.58 -9.02E-03 -2.74 -7.68E-03 -2.05 -9.11E-03 -1.56
1980s data only (n=17) 0.273 0.211 0.749 0.353 0.242
POP -1.10E-08 -0.60 -1.04E-08 -0.54 -1.37E-08 -1.27 -1.32E-08 -0.76 -6.93E-09 -0.35
RGDP 6.56E-07 1.17 7.36E-07 1.10 1.87E-06 4.53 1.36E-06 1.97 1.03E-06 1.33
GVT 4.81E-04 2.17 4.42E-04 1.58 2.16E-04 1.54 3.29E-04 1.43 4.08E-04 1.64
OPEN 4.26E-05 1.23 5.22E-05 0.99 7.06E-05 3.33 8.38E-05 2.00 3.27E-05 0.86
[ethnicity] -2.01E-03 -0.25 -1.44E-02 -4.87 -1.45E-02 -1.58 1.41E-04 0.71
CONSTANT -1.17E-02 -1.39 -1.25E-02 -1.34 -2.13E-02 -4.01 -1.93E-02 -2.08 -1.96E-02 -1.39
1990s data only (n=17) 0.459 0.421 0.798 0.451 0.505
POP -4.70E-08 -1.31 -4.75E-08 -1.28 -5.58E-08 -2.53 -5.44E-08 -1.47 -4.07E-08 -1.18
RGDP 1.83E-06 1.60 2.06E-06 1.60 3.32E-06 4.30 2.54E-06 1.82 3.09E-06 2.21
GVT 1.31E-03 3.10 1.20E-03 2.42 9.85E-04 3.66 1.21E-03 2.72 1.12E-03 2.62
OPEN 5.04E-05 0.77 7.58E-05 0.87 8.08E-05 1.99 8.29E-05 1.10 8.51E-06 0.12
[ethnicity] -6.32E-03 -0.46 -2.31E-02 -4.59 -1.47E-02 -0.90 4.70E-04 1.45
CONSTANT -3.37E-02 -1.93 -3.61E-02 -1.92 -4.61E-02 -4.18 -4.23E-02 -2.11 -6.24E-02 -2.41
t-ratios for regressions on pooled data use panel-corrected standard errors computed with Shazam (8.0)'s OLS/HETCOV
option.
critical t-values for the whole-panel regressions are  …. without ethnicity (63 d.f.) and …. with ethnicity (62 d.f.); for the decade regressions
they are … without ethnicity (12 d.f.) and … with ethnicity (11 d.f.), for a two-tailed test at the 95 percent confidence level.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 16
Table 4.  Regression results explaining economic growth
(a) The simple growth model (n=117)
coef. t-ratio signif.
pop60 4.66E-06 3.22 ***
gdp60 6.82E-05 1.27
open60 1.47E-02 3.18 ***
constant 9.98E-01 2.62 **
R-sq.= 10.4%
Note: Dependent variable is annual growth in per-capita real GDP, 1960-90, estimated
by OLS method from Penn World Tables 5.6 data (series CGDPCH).
Units are percentage points (dep. var.), thousands of persons (pop60), US dollars
at PPP prices (gdp60), and percentage points (open60).  All indep. variables are
measured as 1960-62 averages.  Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity using STATA's "robust".
Significance levels are 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90 (*).
(b) The growth model with diversity effects
Diversity="Ethnic1" (n=105) Diversity="Ethnic2" (n=113) Diversity="Lang"   (n=95)
coef. t-ratio sig. coef. t-ratio sig. coef. t-ratio sig.
pop60 8.83E-06 1.95 * 4.23E-06 2.86 *** 4.98E-06 3.73 ***
gdp60 -4.54E-05 -0.69 -2.41E-05 -0.44 -1.29E-04 -1.78 *
open60 1.70E-02 4.42 *** 1.41E-02 3.38 *** 1.73E-02 4.56 ***
diversity -2.55E-02 -3.69 *** -2.70E-02 -3.59 *** -3.56E-02 -4.50 ***
constant 2.11E+00 3.92 *** 2.07E+00 4.47 *** 2.68E+00 4.66 ***
R-sq.= 23.7% 20.6% 27.9%
Note:  As above, plus diversity measures are “ethnic1”, probability (out of 100) that two randomly selected people will belong to
the same ethnolinguistic group (ELH60 measure of Easterly & Levine 1997); “ethnic2”, percentage of people outiside the
dominant group (EH of Vanhanen 1991); or “lang”, probability that two people will speak different languages (from Easterly
& Levine 1997).Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 17
Table 4.  Regression results explaining economic growth (continued)







coef. t-ratio sig. coef. t-ratio sig. coef. t-ratio sig.
pop60 8.59E-06 2.00 ** 5.15E-06 3.99 *** 5.54E-06 4.50 ***
gdp60 -2.45E-04 -4.07 *** -2.50E-04 -4.28 *** -3.20E-04 -5.26 ***
open60 1.98E-02 5.28 *** 1.81E-02 4.82 *** 2.09E-02 6.13 ***
diversity -1.78E-02 -2.73 *** -1.30E-02 -1.91 * -2.48E-02 -3.34 ***
tropics -1.81E+00 -4.69 *** -2.22E+00 -5.88 *** -2.06E+00 -5.21 ***
const. 3.32E+00 7.21 *** 3.37E+00 7.75 *** 3.85E+00 8.35 ***
R-square 33.6% 36.1% 41.7%
Note:  As above, but “tropics” is dummy variable set to 1 for countries whose absolute latitude, as reported by Hall & Jones (1998),
falls within 30 degrees of the equator.
(d) The growth model with diversity, tropics and interaction effects
Diversity="Ethnic1" (n=105) Diversity="Ethnic2" (n=113) Diversity="Lang"   (n=95)
coef. t-ratio sig. coef. t-ratio sig. coef. t-ratio sig.
pop60 8.70E-06 2.11 ** 5.11E-06 2.57 ** 5.96E-06 4.39 ***
gdp60 -3.75E-03 -3.82 *** -2.91E-03 -2.66 *** -4.10E-03 -5.82 ***
open60 2.01E-02 5.67 *** 1.77E-02 4.23 *** 2.02E-02 5.70 ***
diversity -2.46E-02 -2.78 *** 1.61E-02 -1.85 * -3.22E-02 -3.24 ***
tropics -1.83E+00 -4.76 *** -2.22E+00 -5.07 *** -2.02E+00 -5.10 ***
gdpXdiv 3.68E-06 1.88 * 1.86E-06 0.56 5.18E-06 1.87 *
const. 3.64E+00 6.72 *** 3.49E+00 6.83 *** 4.04E+00 8.38 ***
R-square 34.6% 36.3% 42.5%
Note:  As above, but “gdpXdiv” is the interaction of gdp60 with diversity.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 18
Annex Table A.  Countries included and omitted from worldwide samples
All Countries (n=125) Not in LANG Not in ETHNIC1 Not in ETHNIC2 & OPPO
ALGERIA GUINEA PANAMA BANGLADESH BANGLADESH HONG KONG
ANGOLA GUINEA-BISS PAPUA N.GUINEA BARBADOS CAPE VERDE IS. IRAN
ARGENTINA GUYANA PARAGUAY BURUNDI CHINA IRAQ
AUSTRALIA HAITI PERU CAPE VERDE IS. COMOROS IRELAND
AUSTRIA HONDURAS PHILIPPINES CENTRAL AFR.R. CZECHOSLOVAKIA NAMIBIA
BANGLADESH HONG KONG PORTUGAL COMOROS FIJI PUERTO RICO
BARBADOS ICELAND PUERTO RICO CONGO GUINEA-BISS REUNION
BELGIUM INDIA REUNION FIJI IRAN SAUDI ARABIA
BENIN INDONESIA ROMANIA GABON IRAQ SEYCHELLES
BOLIVIA IRAN RWANDA GAMBIA NAMIBIA TAIWAN
BOTSWANA IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA GERMANY WEST PUERTO RICO U.S.S.R.
BRAZIL IRELAND SENEGAL GUINEA-BISS REUNION UGANDA
BURKINA FASO ISRAEL SEYCHELLES GUYANA ROMANIA
BURUNDI ITALY SIERRA LEONE IRAN SAUDI ARABIA
CAMEROON IVORY COAST SINGAPORE IRAQ SEYCHELLES
CANADA JAPAN SOMALIA LUXEMBOURG SURINAME
CAPE VERDE IS. JORDAN SOUTH AFRICA MALAWI SWAZILAND
CENTRAL AFR.R. KENYA SPAIN MALAYSIA U.S.S.R.
CHAD KOREA REP. SRI LANKA MAURITIUS UGANDA
CHILE LESOTHO SURINAME MEXICO YUGOSLAVIA
CHINA LIBERIA SWAZILAND NAMIBIA
COLOMBIA LUXEMBOURG SWEDEN REUNION
COMOROS MADAGASCAR SWITZERLAND SAUDI ARABIA
CONGO MALAWI SYRIA SEYCHELLES
COSTA RICA MALAYSIA TAIWAN SURINAME
CYPRUS MALI TANZANIA SWAZILAND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA MALTA THAILAND TANZANIA
DENMARK MAURITANIA TOGO U.S.S.R.
DOMINICAN REP. MAURITIUS TRINIDAD&TOBAGO UGANDA
ECUADOR MEXICO TUNISIA URUGUAY
EGYPT MOROCCO TURKEY





GABON NEW ZEALAND VENEZUELA
GAMBIA NICARAGUA YUGOSLAVIA




Note:  "All countries" sample has data for each economic variable (from PWT 5.6)
"Not in LANG" & "Not in ETHNIC1" countries are omitted from sample with LANG & ETHNIC1 variables (from Easterly & Levine 1997)
"Not in ETHNIC2 & OPPO" countries are omitted from sample with those variables (from Vanhanen 1991)
For Sierra Leone, missing values for 1960 are set to 1961 observations.  For Angola, Barbados, Botswana, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Malta, Nepal, Niger,
Puerto Rico, Reunion, Romania, SaudiArabia, Somalia, Surinam, Swanziland, Tanzania, USSR and Zaire, values are missing for 1990 and set to 1989 observations.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 19
Annex Table B.  Data used in all regressions
Gro60-90 POP60-62 GDP60-62 GVT60-62 OPEN60-62 GVT81-90 OPEN81-90 ETHNIC1 ETHNIC2 LANG OPPO
ALGERIA 2.79% 11017 1532 20 65 28 58 43% 17% 37% 2%
ANGOLA -1.89% 4919 964 12 37 22 40 78% 63% 76% 0%
ARGENTINA 0.55% 20941 4589 11 17 11 25 31% 3% 27% 25%
AUSTRALIA 2.11% 10500 7778 8 31 13 55 32% 4% 1% 32%
AUSTRIA 3.02% 7088 5337 13 47 11 96 13% 4% 0% 34%
BANGLADESH 0.76% 53499 963 18 25 25 69 15% 0%
BARBADOS 3.52% 232 2828 7 107 12 132 22% 8% 22%
BELGIUM 2.78% 9168 5753 9 80 19 152 55% 42% 46% 44%
BENIN -0.50% 2102 1098 28 20 24 65 62% 41% 66% 1%
BOLIVIA 1.34% 3508 1172 13 51 25 76 68% 55% 60% 16%
BOTSWANA 6.01% 494 559 15 56 21 67 51% 66% 50% 7%
BRAZIL 3.51% 74818 1860 12 12 9 51 7% 47% 9% 7%
BURKINA FASO 1.01% 4484 432 13 14 20 41 68% 46% 52% 0%
BURUNDI 0.43% 2967 589 3 24 20 41 4% 17% 0%
CAMEROON 3.10% 5428 666 14 50 17 50 89% 79% 70% 0%
CANADA 3.05% 18265 7375 11 37 13 77 75% 39% 33% 25%
CAPE VERDE IS. 3.40% 203 469 3 135 17 79 30% 2%
CENTRAL AFR.R. -0.55% 1630 706 30 64 23 57 69% 68% 0%
CHAD -2.91% 3119 772 22 35 23 56 83% 70% 55% 0%
CHILE 0.74% 7883 2988 17 28 18 38 14% 10% 6% 0%
CHINA 3.69% 664393 496 10 8 14 25 6% 40% 0%
COLOMBIA 2.46% 16281 1729 9 27 23 45 6% 50% 13% 11%
COMOROS -0.18% 202 551 16 53 36 81 1% 0%
CONGO 3.28% 972 1125 27 104 30 87 66% 48% 0%
COSTA RICA 1.63% 1298 2128 17 48 18 90 7% 15% 14% 17%
CYPRUS 4.34% 575 2223 19 78 22 87 35% 19% 25% 32%
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 3.53% 13752 1691 23 28 25 67 36% 36% 0%
DENMARK 2.23% 4613 7138 13 63 31 90 5% 1% 6% 42%
DOMINICAN REP. 2.38% 3422 1231 14 40 14 54 4% 25% 0% 17%
ECUADOR 2.88% 4703 1460 14 34 25 55 53% 50% 20% 14%
EGYPT 3.17% 26555 829 25 40 29 54 4% 6% 2% 0%
EL SALVADOR 0.54% 2660 1471 15 45 27 43 17% 6% 4% 12%
ETHIOPIA 0.58% 23088 261 14 21 25 74 69% 70% 69% 0%
FIJI 2.18% 407 2133 13 64 19 77 50% 19%
FINLAND 3.26% 4461 5569 10 44 15 50 16% 6% 20% 41%
FRANCE 2.76% 46282 6104 14 26 17 68 26% 7% 9% 28%
GABON 2.31% 464 1960 9 78 26 102 69% 66% 0%
GAMBIA 1.18% 381 567 17 68 22 99 73% 57% 10%Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 20
Annex Table B.  Data used in all regressions (continued)
Gro60-90 POP60-62 GDP60-62 GVT60-62 OPEN60-62 GVT81-90 OPEN81-90 ETHNIC1 ETHNIC2 LANG OPPO
GERMANY WEST 2.51% 56149 6803 12 34 18 42 3% 7% 39%
GHANA -0.46% 7012 921 9 49 18 39 71% 56% 58% 0%
GREECE 3.79% 8391 2249 10 26 14 83 10% 5% 11% 35%
GUATEMALA 1.00% 4008 1680 7 28 14 49 64% 50% 60% 6%
GUINEA 1.49% 3906 583 9 32 22 60 75% 59% 72% 0%
GUINEA-BISS 0.38% 537 497 15 36 32 88 73% 0%
GUYANA -0.74% 551 1575 17 103 28 81 58% 49% 7%
HAITI 0.07% 3923 904 13 39 18 49 1% 5% 20% 0%
HONDURAS 1.19% 2002 1039 12 45 12 140 16% 10% 5% 18%
HONG KONG 6.41% 3165 2388 1 180 9 148 2% 8%
ICELAND 3.75% 179 4995 11 90 23 44 5% 3% 35% 33%
INDIA 1.67% 444371 759 27 12 22 32 89% 60% 70% 16%
INDONESIA 4.54% 96521 652 12 19 14 34 76% 60% 64% 4%
IRAN 0.36% 21014 2907 5 35 25 39
IRAQ 0.13% 7061 3594 22 65 25 93
IRELAND 3.17% 2827 3468 12 71 24 95 4% 32%
ISRAEL 3.17% 2197 3744 22 44 22 60 20% 17% 38% 32%
ITALY 3.22% 50522 4897 11 26 16 56 4% 2% 5% 44%
IVORY COAST 0.67% 3958 1152 9 66 18 88 86% 80% 76% 0%
JAPAN 4.87% 94964 3286 10 20 19 70 1% 1% 1% 26%
JORDAN 4.11% 1746 1259 18 57 26 85 5% 2% 5% 0%
KENYA 1.51% 8344 604 11 58 17 62 83% 79% 75% 0%
KOREA REP. 7.05% 25424 917 13 19 14 84 0% 0% 0% 3%
LESOTHO 4.47% 889 328 7 68 29 127 22% 10% 29% 0%
LIBERIA 0.12% 1078 730 15 80 17 154 83% 73% 69% 12%
LUXEMBOURG 2.38% 319 8239 7 162 14 114 15% 26% 28%
MADAGASCAR -1.99% 5464 1185 11 36 23 44 6% 74% 13% 9%
MALAWI 1.01% 3609 393 17 59 23 86 62% 41% 0%
MALAYSIA 4.56% 8449 1479 11 86 20 86 72% 56% 11%
MALI 0.64% 4278 518 17 24 21 105 78% 67% 79% 0%
MALTA 6.14% 329 1361 16 122 20 140 8% 6% 33% 32%
MAURITANIA 0.08% 997 817 23 70 19 119 33% 20% 25% 0%
MAURITIUS 2.22% 675 3067 9 71 13 73 58% 32% 23%
MEXICO 2.57% 39484 2866 5 19 13 51 30% 45% 8%
MOROCCO 2.77% 12223 973 11 43 29 52 53% 1% 36% 4%
MOZAMBIQUE -2.16% 7719 1178 22 49 28 34 65% 48% 74% 0%
MYANMAR 1.86% 22256 334 20 42 28 76 47% 32% 39% 0%
NAMIBIA 1.34% 790 1852 14 75 40 95Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 21
Annex Table B.  Data used in all regressions (continued)
Gro60-90 POP60-62 GDP60-62 GVT60-62 OPEN60-62 GVT81-90 OPEN81-90 ETHNIC1 ETHNIC2 LANG OPPO
NEPAL 1.91% 9586 620 25 16 27 78 70% 46% 30% 0%
NETHERLANDS 2.39% 11644 6235 13 88 13 82 10% 64% 2% 40%
NEW ZEALAND 1.30% 2433 8060 11 47 24 57 37% 10% 4% 34%
NICARAGUA -0.96% 1626 1705 8 49 29 51 18% 31% 6% 12%
NIGER -0.52% 3316 566 26 22 24 46 73% 48% 72% 0%
NIGERIA 2.90% 52930 557 12 20 21 62 87% 71% 81% 0%
NORWAY 3.49% 3610 5847 12 85 23 84 4% 2% 10% 36%
PAKISTAN 2.29% 47194 656 15 28 24 54 64% 34% 53% 0%
PANAMA 2.32% 1180 1682 19 71 29 83 28% 30% 8% 15%
PAPUA N.GUINEA 0.11% 1975 1327 36 44 21 73 42% 17% 84% 25%
PARAGUAY 2.46% 1873 1207 13 31 15 42 14% 10% 44% 3%
PERU 0.45% 10241 2143 13 41 16 42 59% 46% 50% 18%
PHILIPPINES 1.51% 28757 1168 12 28 13 45 74% 7% 70% 5%
PORTUGAL 4.19% 8967 1980 10 42 18 104 1% 1% 0% 32%
PUERTO RICO 2.92% 2428 3356 10 104 24 110 8%
REUNION 3.68% 348 1162 24 71 21 49
ROMANIA 5.86% 18538 455 3 25 15 37 11% 11% 2%
RWANDA 2.18% 2836 503 17 24 28 57 14% 12% 10% 0%
SAUDI ARABIA 2.18% 4211 4158 14 71 28 77
SENEGAL 0.20% 3581 1074 26 60 31 89 72% 65% 77% 3%
SEYCHELLES 4.17% 43 1233 17 46 34 72
SIERRA LEONE -0.35% 2362 923 28 88 20 195 77% 66% 76% 1%
SINGAPORE 7.38% 1700 1733 6 309 19 256 42% 23% 42% 13%
SOMALIA -1.30% 2634 1156 7 30 22 56 8% 5% 16% 0%
SOUTH AFRICA 1.32% 18442 2232 14 54 17 46 88% 28% 82% 2%
SPAIN 3.03% 30756 3479 9 19 15 52 44% 27% 26% 28%
SRI LANKA 2.27% 10136 1222 21 89 20 99 47% 26% 34% 17%
SURINAME 1.47% 298 2042 16 101 27 120 65% 0%
SWAZILAND 1.87% 316 1473 34 84 25 104 5% 0%
SWEDEN 2.00% 7521 7927 15 44 16 69 8% 5% 6% 37%
SWITZERLAND 1.55% 5457 9936 7 60 13 58 50% 35% 33% 23%
SYRIA 3.74% 4706 1705 9 48 16 70 22% 11% 9% 0%
TAIWAN 6.49% 11151 1303 19 32 25 68 42% 30%
TANZANIA 1.63% 10333 316 21 60 26 46 93% 79% 1%
THAILAND 4.19% 27222 966 10 37 22 78 66% 46% 29% 4%
TOGO 1.85% 1559 368 25 67 26 99 71% 54% 63% 0%
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO 1.74% 807 5915 4 121 15 76 56% 59% 22% 17%Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 22
Annex Table B.  Data used in all regressions (continued)
Gro60-90 POP60-62 GDP60-62 GVT60-62 OPEN60-62 GVT81-90 OPEN81-90 ETHNIC1 ETHNIC2 LANG OPPO
TUNISIA 3.85% 4298 1116 15 50 15 60 16% 2% 10% 0%
TURKEY 2.68% 28207 1641 9 16 15 46 25% 13% 15% 12%
U.K. 2.12% 52973 6924 17 42 16 36 32% 6% 2% 32%
U.S.A. 1.90% 183632 10066 13 9 14 18 50% 17% 14% 15%
U.S.S.R. 4.16% 217915 2532 8 5 15 22
UGANDA -0.09% 6843 585 17 23 16 59
URUGUAY 0.73% 2568 3929 7 30 26 75 20% 10% 37%
VENEZUELA -0.35% 7596 6491 10 46 18 66 11% 31% 10% 17%
YUGOSLAVIA 3.71% 18611 1990 24 34 16 48 64% 25% 0%
ZAIRE -0.99% 16294 513 18 18 28 59 90% 82% 84% 0%
ZAMBIA -1.02% 3230 956 14 95 32 63 82% 66% 80% 1%
ZIMBABWE 0.97% 3750 979 7 86 24 59 54% 20% 50% 8%
Note: 1960 value set to 1961 for Sierra Leone, 1990 set to 1989 for Angola, Barbados, Botswana, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Malta, Nepal, Niger,
Puerto Rico, Reunion, Romania, SaudiArabia, Somalia, Surinam, Swanziland, Tanzania, USSR and Zaire.
Sources: Detailed in text.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 23
Annex Table C1.  Donor countries' aid as share of real income and sociopolitical diversity levels
Aid (as share of real GDP) Sociopolitical diversity
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s migr democ lang ethnic1 ethnic2
AUSTRALIA 0.09% 0.26% 0.36% 0.39% 0.32% 32% 1% 4% 32%
AUSTRIA 0.01% 0.10% 0.27% 0.66% 0.85% 34% 0% 4% 13%
BELGIUM 0.11% 0.40% 0.49% 0.75% 0.20% 44% 46% 42% 55%
CANADA 0.07% 0.28% 0.40% 0.57% 0.60% 25% 33% 39% 75%
DENMARK 0.04% 0.51% 1.11% 2.51% 0.21% 42% 6% 1% 5%
FINLAND 0.01% 0.10% 0.59% 1.85% 0.17% 41% 20% 6% 16%
FRANCE 0.21% 0.26% 0.58% 1.18% 0.13% 28% 9% 7% 26%
GERMANY 0.08% 0.29% 0.52% 0.97% 0.61% 39% 0% 7% 3%
ITALY 0.02% 0.04% 0.25% 0.62% 0.08% 44% 5% 2% 4%
JAPAN 0.03% 0.13% 0.46% 0.80% -0.01% 26% 1% 1% 1%
NETHERLANDS 0.06% 0.51% 1.01% 1.54% 0.21% 40% 2% 64% 10%
NEW ZEALAND 0.03% 0.10% 0.16% 0.21% 0.34% 34% 4% 10% 37%
NORWAY 0.05% 0.62% 1.53% 2.85% 0.30% 36% 10% 2% 4%
SWEDEN 0.06% 0.69% 1.17% 2.69% 0.37% 37% 6% 5% 8%
SWITZERLAND 0.01% 0.15% 0.51% 1.34% 0.68% 23% 33% 35% 50%
UNITED KINGDOM 0.08% 0.15% 0.28% 0.45% 0.08% 32% 2% 6% 32%
UNITED STATES 0.16% 0.13% 0.21% 0.25% 0.34% 15% 14% 17% 50%
Aid data are decade averages of annual data for 1961-69, 1970-79, 1980-79 and 1990-92.
Aid is Official Development Assistance (ODA), calculated from OECD (1998) as a share of real GDP from Penn World Tables 5.6.
"MIGR" is the net migration rate (share of population in 1993), calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base, Table 008.
"DEMOC" is the share of population voting for opposition parties, Vanhanen's democratisation index "ID-85" from Vanhanen (1989).
"LANG" is the probability of two randomly selected individuals speaking different languages, the "MULLER" variable in Easterly & Levine (1995).
"ETHNIC1" is the share of the population in a non-dominant ethnolinguistic group, calculated from Vanhanen (1989)'s Ethnic Heterogeneity index.
"ETHNIC2" is the probability of two randomly selected individuals being of a different ethnolinguistic group, "ETHNIC" in Easterly & Levine (1995).Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 24
Table C2.  Donor countries' population size and real income level by decade, 1960s-1990s
Population (thousands) Real income (GDP at PPP prices)
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
AUSTRALIA 11,384 13,671 15,706 17,273 8,955 11,499 13,425 14,386
AUSTRIA 7,250 7,528 7,570 7,806 6,191 8,934 11,109 12,833
BELGIUM 9,417 9,762 9,869 10,004 6,728 9,636 11,473 13,375
CANADA 19,676 22,540 25,105 27,089 8,615 12,207 15,449 16,634
DENMARK 4,757 5,039 5,121 5,155 8,287 10,574 12,539 14,005
FINLAND 4,558 4,691 4,881 5,021 6,368 9,219 12,085 12,907
FRANCE 48,554 52,404 55,073 57,052 7,342 10,450 12,380 13,897
GERMANY 58,332 61,510 61,430 64,157 7,747 10,454 12,533 14,599
ITALY 51,939 55,173 57,015 57,745 5,919 8,507 10,927 12,604
JAPAN 98,789 110,481 120,222 123,819 4,746 8,482 11,623 14,791
NETHERLANDS 12,277 13,582 14,484 15,065 7,350 10,304 11,538 13,169
NEW ZEALAND 2,631 3,010 3,241 3,401 8,654 10,242 11,262 11,310
NORWAY 3,727 3,987 4,152 4,263 6,923 9,749 13,563 15,156
SWEDEN 7,738 8,180 8,368 8,624 9,219 11,531 13,357 14,370
SWITZERLAND 5,829 6,362 6,466 6,803 11,115 13,360 14,921 16,212
UNITED KINGDOM 54,286 56,117 56,641 57,608 7,639 9,438 11,337 12,920
UNITED STATES 193,814 215,026 238,160 252,687 11,539 14,226 16,365 17,864
All data are decade averages of annual data for 1961-69, 1970-79, 1980-79 and 1990-92.
Population is calculated from the Penn World Tables 5.6 (1998).
Real GDP at PPP prices is calculated using chain index from the Penn World Tables 5.6 (1998).Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 25
Table C3.  Donor countries' government size and openness to trade by decade, 1960s-1990s
Government size (as share of real GDP) Openness to trade (X+M/GDP)
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
AUSTRALIA 9.4% 11.4% 12.4% 13.2% 30.5% 30.3% 33.7% 35.8%
AUSTRIA 13.1% 13.6% 14.0% 12.5% 49.4% 64.5% 75.7% 78.8%
BELGIUM 10.3% 12.1% 12.3% 10.4% 85.9% 108.8% 143.0% 141.4%
CANADA 12.1% 13.8% 12.3% 12.5% 39.6% 46.9% 52.3% 51.9%
DENMARK 14.3% 19.2% 21.8% 19.4% 59.1% 59.9% 68.0% 66.5%
FINLAND 11.5% 14.0% 15.6% 16.9% 42.6% 54.2% 57.2% 48.5%
FRANCE 13.7% 14.1% 15.2% 14.6% 26.2% 37.1% 44.7% 45.1%
GERMANY 13.5% 14.8% 15.3% 13.0% 35.9% 44.9% 56.3% 59.8%
ITALY 11.7% 12.2% 11.9% 11.5% 27.9% 40.6% 43.4% 40.0%
JAPAN 9.7% 8.7% 8.6% 7.3% 19.3% 22.9% 23.9% 19.3%
NETHERLANDS 12.3% 11.8% 12.1% 11.1% 83.4% 90.2% 105.6% 102.5%
NEW ZEALAND 12.1% 14.2% 14.4% 13.7% 46.0% 53.3% 59.7% 57.5%
NORWAY 12.8% 16.2% 17.1% 18.8% 83.7% 87.3% 82.3% 80.3%
SWEDEN 16.5% 21.0% 23.0% 22.7% 43.0% 54.1% 64.5% 55.9%
SWITZERLAND 7.5% 8.7% 9.0% 9.1% 59.8% 65.7% 73.9% 70.1%
UNITED KINGDOM 18.0% 19.8% 18.5% 17.2% 41.0% 52.7% 52.5% 49.6%
UNITED STATES 14.0% 13.8% 13.3% 13.1% 9.7% 15.3% 19.3% 21.7%
All data are decade averages of annual data for 1961-69, 1970-79, 1980-79 and 1990-92.
Government size is central government expenditure as share of real GDP from the Penn World Tables 5.6 (1998).
Openness is exports + imports / nominal GDP, from the Penn World Tables 5.6 (1998).Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 26
TABLE D.  REGRESSION RESULTS USING NET MIGRATION (1990s DATA ONLY)
R-sq. est. coef. t-ratio







Note:  The critical t-value for this regression (with 11 d.f.) is  ….
for a two-tailed test at a 95 percent confidence level.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 27
TABLE E1.  FOREIGN AID REGRESSION RESULTS OMITTING "OPEN"
No ethnicity variable Ethnicity=ETHNIC1 Ethnicity=ETHNIC2 Ethnicity=LANG Ethnicity=OPPO
R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef.
Whole panel (n=68) 0.509 0.509 0.614 0.514 0.546
POP -3.24E-08 -2.46 -3.25E-08 -2.40 -3.33E-08 -3.57 -3.46E-08 -2.56 -1.72E-08
RGDP 1.23E-06 5.44 1.23E-06 5.25 1.48E-06 6.42 1.27E-06 5.41 1.37E-06
GVT 5.95E-04 2.89 5.94E-04 2.65 4.04E-04 2.56 5.48E-04 2.50 5.01E-04
[ethnicity] -4.67E-05 -0.01 -1.02E-02 -4.07 -3.47E-03 -0.61 2.07E-04
CONSTANT -1.56E-02 -4.85 -1.56E-02 -4.48 -1.33E-02 -4.78 -1.50E-02 -4.39 -2.35E-02
1960s data only (n=17) 0.130 0.099 0.168 0.125 0.062
POP 4.44E-09 1.66 4.75E-09 1.73 4.39E-09 1.68 4.87E-09 1.79 3.90E-09
RGDP 5.46E-08 0.74 3.88E-08 0.50 -5.35E-09 -0.06 3.17E-08 0.41 4.23E-08
GVT 4.38E-05 0.87 5.53E-05 1.03 6.25E-05 1.21 6.64E-05 1.19 4.76E-05
[ethnicity] 5.66E-04 0.74 8.72E-04 1.26 1.04E-03 0.96 -6.07E-06
CONSTANT -4.73E-04 -0.56 -5.87E-04 -0.67 -4.50E-04 -0.54 -7.08E-04 -0.80 -2.02E-04
1970s data only (n=17) 0.223 0.258 0.290 0.159 0.235
POP -1.34E-08 -1.56 -9.59E-09 -1.08 -1.53E-08 -1.84 -1.31E-08 -1.38 -7.17E-09
RGDP 2.89E-07 1.01 1.22E-07 0.39 6.06E-07 1.75 2.78E-07 0.84 5.45E-07
GVT 2.56E-04 1.98 3.32E-04 2.37 2.04E-04 1.59 2.59E-04 1.82 2.13E-04
[ethnicity] 3.56E-03 1.27 -3.65E-03 -1.49 3.02E-04 0.08 9.80E-05
CONSTANT -3.35E-03 -0.97 -3.35E-03 -0.99 -4.98E-03 -1.43 -3.33E-03 -0.92 -8.97E-03
1980s data only (n=17) 0.245 0.213 0.538 0.191 0.258
POP -2.31E-08 -1.47 -1.91E-08 -1.12 -3.18E-08 -2.52 -2.60E-08 -1.44 -1.32E-08
RGDP 5.87E-07 1.03 4.63E-07 0.76 1.54E-06 2.83 7.21E-07 1.05 1.15E-06
GVT 4.53E-04 2.02 5.39E-04 2.07 2.23E-04 1.16 4.15E-04 1.65 3.57E-04
[ethnicity] 3.81E-03 0.69 -1.17E-02 -3.04 -3.03E-03 -0.38 2.04E-04
CONSTANT -7.26E-03 -0.94 -7.66E-03 -0.97 -1.28E-02 -2.02 -7.96E-03 -0.97 -2.02E-02
1990s data only (n=17) 0.476 0.433 0.748 0.441 0.546
POP -6.16E-08 -2.06 -6.01E-08 -1.78 -7.81E-08 -3.68 -6.86E-08 -1.96 -4.25E-08
RGDP 1.86E-06 1.65 1.81E-06 1.46 3.27E-06 3.79 2.16E-06 1.58 3.14E-06
GVT 1.24E-03 3.05 1.26E-03 2.59 8.89E-04 3.00 1.17E-03 2.63 1.10E-03
[ethnicity] 1.18E-03 0.11 -2.15E-02 -3.87 -6.12E-03 -0.42 4.86E-04
CONSTANT -2.94E-02 -1.80 -2.94E-02 -1.73 -3.85E-02 -3.33 -3.18E-02 -1.79 -6.28E-02
t-ratios for regressions on pooled data use panel-corrected standard errors computed with Shazam (8.0)'s OLS/HETCOV option.
critical t-values for the whole-panel regressions are  …. without ethnicity (64 d.f.) and …. with ethnicity (63 d.f.); for the decade regressions
they are … without ethnicity (13 d.f.) and … with ethnicity (12 d.f.), for a two-tailed test at the 95 percent confidence level.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 28
TABLE E2. FOREIGN AID REGRESSION RESULTS OMITTING "GVT"
No ethnicity variable Ethnicity=ETHNIC1 Ethnicity=ETHNIC2 Ethnicity=LANG Ethnicity=OPPO
R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef.
Whole panel 0.410 0.459 0.582 0.460 0.477
POP -3.24E-08 -1.71 -2.44E-08 -1.42 -2.80E-08 -2.41 -3.01E-08 -1.76 -1.83E-08
RGDP 1.30E-06 4.82 1.31E-06 5.05 1.54E-06 6.17 1.37E-06 5.27 1.53E-06
OPEN 2.33E-05 0.60 6.66E-05 1.66 3.26E-05 1.36 4.97E-05 1.35 -5.21E-06
[ethnicity] -9.40E-03 -2.12 -1.25E-02 -5.44 -1.17E-02 -2.08 2.86E-04
CONSTANT -9.53E-03 -3.17 -1.10E-02 -3.71 -9.90E-03 -3.69 -1.06E-02 -3.65 -2.07E-02
1960s data only 0.083 0.020 0.069 0.022 0.007
POP 5.34E-09 1.49 4.91E-09 1.27 5.31E-09 1.47 5.25E-09 1.41 5.27E-09
RGDP 5.42E-08 0.72 4.43E-08 0.54 1.11E-08 0.12 4.39E-08 0.54 5.17E-08
OPEN 1.76E-06 0.22 -5.42E-07 -0.05 1.44E-06 0.18 4.99E-07 0.06 1.86E-06
[ethnicity] 3.70E-04 0.39 6.28E-04 0.90 4.82E-04 0.44 -1.24E-06
CONSTANT -3.43E-05 -0.05 1.10E-04 0.13 1.64E-04 0.21 5.38E-05 0.07 2.52E-05
1970s data only 0.163 0.169 0.414 0.257 0.178
POP -4.49E-09 -0.40 -1.51E-09 -0.13 -4.17E-09 -0.44 -3.22E-09 -0.30 6.04E-11
RGDP 3.28E-07 1.10 5.13E-07 1.49 8.14E-07 2.60 5.74E-07 1.80 5.92E-07
OPEN 4.05E-05 1.63 6.25E-05 1.93 4.97E-05 2.36 6.14E-05 2.31 3.18E-05
[ethnicity] -3.70E-03 -1.05 -5.57E-03 -2.56 -6.48E-03 -1.63 1.04E-04
CONSTANT -2.71E-03 -0.76 -5.42E-03 -1.24 -6.96E-03 -2.04 -5.76E-03 -1.50 -8.68E-03
1980s data only 0.065 0.112 0.720 0.296 0.134
POP -2.10E-08 -1.04 -1.45E-08 -0.71 -1.79E-08 -1.62 -1.97E-08 -1.13 -1.01E-08
RGDP 6.80E-07 1.07 1.04E-06 1.54 2.03E-06 4.80 1.64E-06 2.37 1.40E-06
OPEN 3.48E-05 0.89 8.17E-05 1.56 7.11E-05 3.18 9.51E-05 2.21 1.78E-05
[ethnicity] -9.22E-03 -1.30 -1.61E-02 -5.61 -2.00E-02 -2.30 2.76E-04
CONSTANT -4.12E-03 -0.48 -1.05E-02 -1.08 -1.96E-02 -3.58 -1.79E-02 -1.86 -2.19E-02
1990s data only 0.102 0.188 0.589 0.158 0.264
POP -8.25E-08 -1.88 -7.42E-08 -1.76 -8.25E-08 -2.78 -9.07E-08 -2.12 -6.45E-08
RGDP 1.97E-06 1.34 2.75E-06 1.85 3.74E-06 3.44 3.23E-06 1.90 3.92E-06
OPEN 2.78E-06 0.03 1.05E-04 1.02 5.41E-05 0.95 6.84E-05 0.74 -5.17E-05
[ethnicity] -2.20E-02 -1.54 -2.80E-02 -4.05 -2.66E-02 -1.36 7.36E-04
CONSTANT -1.31E-02 -0.63 -2.73E-02 -1.25 -3.43E-02 -2.28 -3.15E-02 -1.30 -6.28E-02
t-ratios for regressions on pooled data use panel-corrected standard errors computed with Shazam (8.0)'s OLS/HETCOV option.
critical t-values for the whole-panel regressions are  …. without ethnicity (64 d.f.) and …. with ethnicity (63 d.f.); for the decade regressions;
they are … without ethnicity (13 d.f.) and … with ethnicity (12 d.f.), for a two-tailed test at the 95 percent confidence level.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 29
TABLE E3.  FOREIGN AID REGRESSION RESULTS OMITTING "rGDP"
No ethnicity variable Ethnicity=ETHNIC1 Ethnicity=ETHNIC2 Ethnicity=LANG Ethnicity=OPPO
R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef.
Whole panel (n=68) 0.272 0.273 0.298 0.272 0.276
POP 4.05E-09 0.26 4.58E-09 0.28 7.00E-09 0.49 4.13E-09 0.26 1.07E-10
GVT 7.72E-04 3.80 7.57E-04 3.28 6.98E-04 3.60 7.68E-04 3.51 7.96E-04
OPEN 6.95E-05 2.10 7.30E-05 1.72 7.56E-05 2.45 7.04E-05 1.92 7.44E-05
[ethnicity] -7.71E-04 -0.15 -4.86E-03 -1.71 -3.74E-04 -0.06 -6.32E-05
CONSTANT -9.45E-03 -2.70 -9.35E-03 -2.63 -7.69E-03 -2.24 -9.40E-03 -2.61 -7.79E-03
1960s data only (n=17) 0.098 0.089 0.171 0.114 0.057
POP 5.46E-09 1.54 4.14E-09 1.09 4.81E-09 1.41 4.80E-09 1.35 4.31E-09
GVT 4.41E-05 0.86 6.07E-05 1.11 6.20E-05 1.22 7.03E-05 1.25 5.31E-05
OPEN 2.01E-06 0.26 -3.29E-06 -0.34 1.51E-06 0.20 -1.19E-06 -0.15 3.12E-06
[ethnicity] 8.53E-04 0.94 8.43E-04 1.46 1.24E-03 1.11 -1.42E-05
CONSTANT -1.76E-04 -0.22 -2.20E-04 -0.28 -5.64E-04 -0.70 -4.73E-04 -0.57 1.75E-04
1970s data only (n=17) 0.334 0.306 0.308 0.282 0.284
POP 8.83E-10 0.09 -1.24E-09 -0.12 1.73E-09 0.17 1.22E-09 0.12 -4.23E-10
GVT 2.64E-04 2.20 3.08E-04 2.24 2.46E-04 1.97 2.54E-04 1.94 2.74E-04
OPEN 4.03E-05 1.83 2.83E-05 0.99 4.20E-05 1.86 4.30E-05 1.70 4.25E-05
[ethnicity] 2.15E-03 0.69 -1.39E-03 -0.72 -8.91E-04 -0.25 -2.20E-05
CONSTANT -3.18E-03 -1.36 -3.37E-03 -1.40 -2.70E-03 -1.09 -3.09E-03 -1.26 -2.64E-03
1980s data only (n=17) 0.252 0.197 0.340 0.198 0.194
POP -5.35E-09 -0.30 -6.87E-09 -0.36 -1.95E-09 -0.11 -4.60E-09 -0.25 -7.22E-09
GVT 4.86E-04 2.17 5.30E-04 1.97 3.74E-04 1.69 4.57E-04 1.87 5.04E-04
OPEN 3.85E-05 1.10 2.80E-05 0.58 4.75E-05 1.42 4.57E-05 1.10 4.17E-05
[ethnicity] 2.34E-03 0.33 -6.31E-03 -1.65 -2.80E-03 -0.36 -3.63E-05
CONSTANT -3.41E-03 -0.74 -3.68E-03 -0.76 -9.18E-04 -0.20 -3.15E-03 -0.65 -2.57E-03
1990s data only (n=17) 0.395 0.346 0.502 0.345 0.345
POP -2.01E-08 -0.60 -2.11E-08 -0.60 -1.21E-08 -0.39 -2.05E-08 -0.58 -1.87E-08
GVT 1.34E-03 2.99 1.38E-03 2.67 1.16E-03 2.77 1.35E-03 2.85 1.33E-03
OPEN 5.41E-05 0.78 4.45E-05 0.49 7.43E-05 1.17 4.95E-05 0.62 5.20E-05
[ethnicity] 2.34E-03 0.17 -1.40E-02 -1.95 2.00E-03 0.14 2.49E-05
CONSTANT -9.56E-03 -1.03 -9.83E-03 -1.01 -5.09E-03 -0.58 -9.67E-03 -1.00 -1.02E-02
t-ratios for regressions on pooled data use panel-corrected standard errors computed with Shazam (8.0)'s OLS/HETCOV option.
critical t-values for the whole-panel regressions are  …. without ethnicity (64 d.f.) and …. with ethnicity (63 d.f.); for the decade regressions
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TABLE E4.  FOREIGN AID REGRESSION RESULTS OMITTING "POP"
No ethnicity variable Ethnicity=ETHNIC1 Ethnicity=ETHNIC2 Ethnicity=LANG Ethnicity=OPPO
R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef. t-ratio R-sq. est.coef.
Whole panel (n=68) 0.498 0.508 0.608 0.511 0.539
RGDP 1.03E-06 4.64 1.08E-06 4.71 1.29E-06 5.70 1.09E-06 4.79 1.29E-06
GVT 6.67E-04 3.35 5.65E-04 2.60 4.73E-04 3.28 5.89E-04 2.83 5.30E-04
OPEN 5.93E-05 2.30 7.70E-05 2.57 6.36E-05 3.70 7.25E-05 2.67 2.41E-05
[ethnicity] -4.81E-03 -1.06 -1.05E-02 -4.62 -6.40E-03 -1.14 2.24E-04
CONSTANT -1.90E-02 -5.83 -1.83E-02 -5.59 -1.68E-02 -6.05 -1.86E-02 -5.70 -2.56E-02
1960s data only (n=17) -0.002 0.018 0.034 0.002 -0.028
RGDP 7.22E-08 0.93 3.89E-08 0.47 9.41E-09 0.10 4.35E-08 0.53 2.63E-08
GVT 5.18E-05 0.96 7.03E-05 1.26 7.08E-05 1.28 7.80E-05 1.31 6.26E-05
OPEN -5.17E-06 -0.83 -9.71E-06 -1.32 -5.32E-06 -0.87 -7.75E-06 -1.16 -1.67E-06
[ethnicity] 1.06E-03 1.12 9.05E-04 1.22 1.26E-03 1.03 -2.02E-05
CONSTANT -3.17E-04 -0.32 -2.34E-04 -0.24 -2.79E-04 -0.28 -4.42E-04 -0.44 4.24E-04
1970s data only (n=17) 0.405 0.356 0.553 0.411 0.376
RGDP 3.08E-07 1.25 3.13E-07 0.97 7.04E-07 2.57 4.65E-07 1.63 4.49E-07
GVT 2.64E-04 2.35 2.62E-04 1.87 2.02E-04 2.00 2.17E-04 1.80 2.39E-04
OPEN 4.40E-05 2.67 4.44E-05 1.78 5.17E-05 3.53 5.64E-05 2.80 3.69E-05
[ethnicity] -8.32E-05 -0.02 -4.53E-03 -2.30 -4.03E-03 -1.06 5.09E-05
CONSTANT -6.58E-03 -1.97 -6.62E-03 -1.77 -9.17E-03 -2.96 -7.78E-03 -2.22 -9.03E-03
1980s data only (n=17) 0.309 0.258 0.736 0.376 0.297
RGDP 5.67E-07 1.08 6.77E-07 1.06 1.75E-06 4.25 1.23E-06 1.87 1.03E-06
GVT 5.14E-04 2.46 4.62E-04 1.72 2.61E-04 1.87 3.75E-04 1.72 4.16E-04
OPEN 5.38E-05 1.89 6.53E-05 1.43 8.42E-05 4.48 9.56E-05 2.50 3.77E-05
[ethnicity] -2.57E-03 -0.33 -1.42E-02 -4.70 -1.39E-02 -1.55 1.62E-04
CONSTANT -1.22E-02 -1.50 -1.31E-02 -1.47 -2.18E-02 -4.02 -1.96E-02 -2.15 -2.11E-02
1990s data only (n=17) 0.430 0.391 0.706 0.398 0.489
RGDP 1.12E-06 1.08 1.33E-06 1.12 2.42E-06 2.93 1.51E-06 1.19 2.62E-06
GVT 1.49E-03 3.61 1.39E-03 2.85 1.21E-03 3.95 1.44E-03 3.33 1.25E-03
OPEN 9.59E-05 1.68 1.20E-04 1.45 1.33E-04 3.15 1.21E-04 1.64 4.32E-05
[ethnicity] -5.76E-03 -0.41 -2.20E-02 -3.64 -9.40E-03 -0.56 5.17E-04
CONSTANT -3.10E-02 -1.74 -3.31E-02 -1.73 -4.22E-02 -3.21 -3.61E-02 -1.76 -6.29E-02
t-ratios for regressions on pooled data use panel-corrected standard errors computed with Shazam (8.0)'s OLS/HETCOV option.
critical t-values for the whole-panel regressions are  …. without ethnicity (64 d.f.) and …. with ethnicity (63 d.f.); for the decade regressions
they are … without ethnicity (13 d.f.) and … with ethnicity (12 d.f.), for a two-tailed test at the 95 percent confidence level.Diversity, expenditure and growth across countries p. 31
 TABLE F.  REGRESSION RESULTS USING NET MIGRATION AND OMITTING ECONOMIC VARIABLES (1990s DATA ONLY)
R-sq. est. coef. t-ratio R-sq. est. coef. t-ratio
Omitting "OPEN" 0.630 Omitting "GVT" 0.179
POP -9.07E-08 -3.28 POP -1.08E-07 -2.39
RGDP 3.44E-06 3.03 RGDP 3.36E-06 1.99
GVT 1.31E-03 3.83 OPEN 7.01E-06 0.09
MIGR -2.57E-03 -2.53 MIGR -2.25E-03 -1.49
CONSTANT -4.55E-02 -3.01 CONSTANT -2.65E-02 -1.21
Omitting "POP" 0.494 Omitting "rGRDP" 0.381
RGDP 1.96E-06 1.78 POP -2.13E-08 -0.63
GVT 1.62E-03 4.09 GVT 1.38E-03 3.03
OPEN 1.20E-04 2.15 OPEN 5.81E-05 0.83
MIGR -1.83E-03 -1.63 MIGR -9.31E-04 -0.85
CONSTANT -4.17E-02 -2.31 CONSTANT -8.07E-03 -0.84
Note:  The critical t-value for these regressions (with 12 d.f.) is  ….  for a two-tailed test at a 95 percent confidence level.
TABLE G.  REGRESSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT SIZE AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Donors only All countries All countries All countries All countries
1960-93 panel 1960 1961-70 average 1971-80 average 1981-90 average
est.coef. t-ratio est.coef. t-ratio est.coef. t-ratio est.coef. t-ratio est.coef. t-ratio
POP -1.60E-05 -1.21 1.30E-05 1.12 3.70E-06 0.46 -3.70E-06 -0.48 -4.00E-06 -0.70
RGDP 2.90E-04 2.08 ** -5.40E-04 -2.04 ** -6.90E-04 -3.31 ** -8.80E-04 -4.55 ** -8.20E-04 -5.92 **
LANG -9.47 -1.74 * 5.09 2.36 ** 2.55 1.58 2.26 1.18 1.08 0.65
CONSTANT 12.13 7.44 ** 13.28 11.06 ** 16.15 16.15 ** 21.83 17.83 ** 23.81 22.84 **
R-sq. 16.7% 12.8% 13.3% 20.2% 27.2%
Notes: Regression for donors only is for 17 countries over 4 time periods (1961-69, 1970-79, 1980-89 and 1990-93 averages), pooled so that
n=68, with t-ratios calculated using panel-corrected standard errors computed with the OLS/HETCOV option in Shazam (8.0).
Regressions for all countries have a sample size of 102 (the 1960 observation) and 105 (the 1961-70, 1971-80, and 1981-90 averages).
R-sq. values are adjusted for the all-country samples, not adjusted for the donors-only panel.
Asterisks indicate statistical significance in a two-tailed test at 95 percent (**) and 90 percent (*) confidence levels.TUFTS UNIVERSITY 
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